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Abstract
This paper presents a visualization in three dimensions of the classical
solutions of the bargaining problem for 3 agents. It provides a helpful tool for
game theorists, economists and other researchers and professionals in these
areas in order to visualize and compare the solutions over a wide family of
bargaining problems and gain intuition about general results.
The theory of bargaining, a branch of the Cooperative Game Theory, tries
to find reasonable solutions when two or more agents have to decide over a
wide variety of possible agreements among a family of conflictive situations.
There are a lot of parameters entering in the description of the problem
and also a large number of appealing solutions that have been defined in the
literature. In order to compare and analize the behavior of different solutions
for the different situations, is very important to have a visualization tool.
1 Introduction
The theory of bargaining, a branch of the Cooperative Game Theory, tries to find
reasonable solutions when two or more agents have to decide over a wide variety of
possible agreements among a family of conflictive situations. The basis of Bargain-
ing Theory can be found in the paper by Nash ([Nash 50]). He developed a formal
model of the following situation: Two agents having a feasible set of alternatives can
agree on a particular one. In this case, this one will be the solution to the bargaining
problem; otherwise, they end up at a prespecified feasible alternative representing
the disagreement (disagreement point). Nash developed a theory attempting to pre-
dict how the agents should establish a compromise of their preferences over a family
of conflictive situations. He analyzed a restricted natural class of bargaining prob-
lems and formulated axioms which solutions should satisfy. He also established the
existence of a unique solution that satisfies all the axioms. In this way, Nash estab-
lished the bases of the axiomatic theory of bargaining. His solution was regarded as
the solution until the seventies, when other solutions were introduced. Since then
there has been many activities in this field and numerous solutions have been pro-
posed in the literature. There are a lot of parameters entering in the description
of the problem and it is not easy to compare and analize the behavior of different
solutions for the different situations without an automatic tool.
First we give the theoretical background for the bargaining theory. Then we de-
scribe briefly the work made on bargaining problem visualization until now. After
that, we detaile the motivation for our work and give an overview of the implemen-
tation of the visualization. Finally, we give the conclusions and some directions on
future work.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Domains
We consider now the fundamental points on the theoretical formulation of the bar-
gaining problem. An n−agent Bargainig Problem, is a pair (S, d) where S is a subset
of the n−dimensional Euclidean space (ℜn) and d is a point of S. Let
∑n
d be the
class of problems such that
- S is convex, bounded and closed (contains its boundary)
- d ∈ S being d a strictly dominant point
- It exist p ∈ S with p > d
(1)
The existence of at least one p ∈ S with p > d is postulated to avoid the
somewhat degenerate case when only some of the agents stand to gain from the
agreement. Given p, p′ ∈ ℜn, p ≥ p′ means pi ≥ p
′
i for all i and p 6= p
′ ; the relation
p > p′ means pi > p
′
i for all i.
S is the feasible set, i.e. each point p ∈ S is a feasible alternative and the
coordinates of p give the utility profits (measured in von Neumann - Morgenstern
utilities) for each one of the n agents. d is the disagreement point. Additionally, we
said that a pair (S, d) ∈
∑n
d is d−comprehensive if p ∈ S and p ≥ q ≥ d implies
that q ∈ S.
We usually work with a normalized domain where the disagreement point is the
origin of coordinates and some additional restrictions are imposed on the domains.
The bargaining problems are then restricted to the class of problems
∑n
0
, i.e. the
subclass of
∑n
d consisting of the pairs (S, d) such that they fulfill the conditions
given in (1) and also the following:
- d = 0
- S ⊆ ℜn+
- if p ∈ S then any q ∈ ℜn with 0 ≤ q ≤ p is also in S (ie, q ∈ S)
(2)
If these three conditions (2) are also satisfied we say that S is 0−comprehensive,
or just comprehensive. In summary, we usually deal with the subclass (
∑n
0
) of
problems S, that constitutes an important class for economic applications.
2.2 Solutions
Given a bargaining problem, a solution is a function from the domain to a particular
point in the domain and represents the agreement reached by the agents.
We formally state that a solution is a function F :
∑n → ℜn such that F (S, d) ∈
S (see [Thompson 94]).
The boundary BS of S, could be defined as:
BS = {p ∈ S |∄ p′ ∈ S with p′ > p}
Then, the solution associates with each element (S, d) of the domain an unique
point of S interpreted as a recommendation for that problem, and that point will be
on the boundary, also defined like the convex and comprehensive convex hull (CCH).
2.3 Typical Solutions
Three solutions play a central role in the theory as it appears today. The first one
was the Nash Solution. Nash gave a list of axioms that characterized his solution (see
[Thompson 94]) and tried to capture some properties of fairness and optimality. In
the case of
∑
2
d his solution, N(S, d), is obtained maximizing the area of the rectangle
included in the Bargaining Set (Fig. 1(a)).
Besides the fact that the Nash solution seemed to be very reasonable for most
bargaining problems, in some cases it did not take into account the aspirations of the
agents (see [Thompson 94]) It was in the 70 ’s when Kalai-Smorodinsky ([Kalai 75])
proposed an alternative solution (KS(N, d)). It chooses the most preferred feasible
alternative in the line going from the origin of coordinates to the point consisting of
the maximum aspiration of each agent (Fig 1(b)). This is perhaps the second more
accepted solution.
The third solution, the Egalitarian, E(S, d), ([Thompson 94]) gives the maximum
equal utility alternative to each agent (Fig. 1(c)). This idea of equal gains is central
to many theories of social choice and welfare economics.
Thompson presents in his comprehensive survey ([Thompson 94]) other typical
solutions. There are also other class of solutions favoring one agent at the expense of
the others, but much work should be done to extend this solutions when the number
of agents is greater than 2.
Figure 1: Typical solutions to the bargaining problem (a) Nash (b) Kalai-
Smorodinsky (c) Egalitarian
3 Related Work
Besides the analytical studies mentioned above, there is very few said about how
solutions perform over different sets of Bargaining Problems. This is a very inter-
esting problem, but at the same time very difficult. It is not easy to foresee general
properties, but if we hope to be successful in finding those properties, it would be
helpful to have a tool for solving a wide set of problems. With this aim Cavalie,
Quintas and Welch ([Cavalie 97]) provided a computational tool for 2-agents bar-
gaining problems. It was helpful in providing a wide family of bargaining problems
and also has proved to be a very useful tool for teaching.
4 Extension to 3D
In this article we provide a description of a visualization tool for approaching the
problem in 3-Dimensions. A solution for a three dimensional bargaining problem
will be usually a point in the 3D Comprehensive Convex Hull (CCH) of a certain
set (Fig. 2). In this case we can model the interaction of three agents for different
sets of (S, d) pairs. This certainly enriches the discussion on the solutions, giving
an extra complexity to the analysis, and allowing an approach to a larger set of real
situations.
Figure 2: Example
There is very few written in the literature for the three dimensional case. This
tool has proved to be very useful one in order to visualize diferent sets of (S, d) pairs.
It is also a must in order to gain intuition about general properties. We can just
mention some discussions on the different ways of extending some classical solution
to this case (see [Thompson 94]), that we have also implemented.
4.1 Comprehensive Convex Hull Representation and Gen-
eration
The feasible set for the three dimensional case (three agents) will be represented by
the volume enclosed by the comprehensive convex hull (CCH). This CCH, that
represents the space where the three agents could obtain optimal profits, will be
represented by a triangulated surface denoted by SF or shell of a set of points, in
the positive octant of the three dimensional space.
4.1.1 Data Structure
A polygonal decomposition can be unambiguously described as the collection of 3
primitive elements plus their mutual adjacency relations (see [Weiler 85],[Woo 85]).
According to our problem, we represent the shell with a specific kind of polygonal
decomposition, i.e. a triangulation. The surface SF could be described without
ambiguities like a collection of three primitive elements and their mutual adjacency
relationships. The primitive elements are:
• Vertices (V )
• Edges (E)
• Faces (F )
From the nine pairwise ordered adjacency relations (Fig. 3), that can be defined
over the three primitive topological elements, the Symmetric Data Structure (see
[Woo 85]), encodes the three primitive elements of a 3D triangulation and four of
their mutual adjacency relations representing the topology without ambiguities.
Figure 3: The nine pairwise ordered adjacency relations
We use the Modified Symmetric Data Structure (see [de Floriani 87]) to built
and manipulate the triangulation. This structure encodes the three basic elements
of the triangulation plus three constant (relations FE, EV and EF ) and one partial
relations (relation V E∗). It is showed in (see [de Floriani 87]) that such a structure
is optimal (up to a constant factor) with respect to both space and time complexity.
The time complexity is evaluated in terms of the worst case complexity of those
structure accessing algorithm, which retrieve partial relations, i.e. relations that are
not stored in the data structure.
For each primitive element of the triangulation T , this data structure encodes
the following relations:
• For each face f , a list of index to the sourrounding edges, in counterclockwise
order:
Relation FE
FE(f) = [e1, e2, e3], f ∈ F . F is the set of faces of T and [e1, e2, e3], the
secuence of edges of T bounding f in counterclockwise order.
• For each edge e, indexes to the extreme points of e and to the two incident
faces. In this case, the stored relations are:
Relation EV
EV (e) = [v1, v2], e ∈ E. E is the set of edges of T and [v1, v2] the ordered pair
of vertices of T , which are extremes of edge e.
Relation EF
EF (e) = [f1, f2], e ∈ E. E is the set of edges of T and [f1, f2] the sequence
of faces of T sharing the edge e. Following the edge orientation, f1 is the left
face and f2 the rigth face of e.
• For each vertex, the geometry and an index to one of the incident edges on
that vertex
Partial relation V E∗
V E∗(v) = {ei}, v ∈ V . V is the set of vertices of T and {ei} is one edge of T ,
incident on v.
The topology of the triangulation is then represented without ambiguities with
the three primitive elements (F, E, V ) and the subset of the four adjacency rela-
tions. This subset of relations, gives a topological description of the triangulation
T and assures the eficiency of the algorithms that access the data structure (see
[Weiler 85],[Woo 85]).
4.1.2 Modified Convex Hull in 3D (CCH)
In order to generate our shell, we obtain the surface SF like a comprehensive convex
hull, CCH of 3D points. The CCH is stored in a symmetric modified data structure
detailed in the previous section. We calculate the CCHk using an incremental algo-
rithm, that allows a point to be added interactively without completely recalculate
the shell. The addition of a point to a convex hull, is based in the algorithm given in
([de Berg 97]). The shell is in the positive octant and limited by the planes x = 0,
y = 0 and z = 0. Given a point p, the shell CCHk will be calculated as follows:
A set must be created with all the projections of p on each coordinated plane
and on each coordinated positive axis.
• If k = 0, the CCH does not exist, and the initial shell must be created with
p and all its projections.
• If k > 0, the CCH is the shell of k points and we have two different cases:
1. If p is interior or belongs to this CCHk, the CCHk is not modified.
2. If p is exterior to the shell CCHk, we construct a set of points to be added
to the CCHk with p and all the projected points pi that are exteriors to
the CCHk. In order to do that, we look from pi to the shell in the
direction of the coordinated origin. From this point, some faces or all
can be seen. These faces are the visible region of pi and are limited by a
closed curve: the horizon of pi in the CCHk+i−1 (Fig. 4(a)). This horizon
is the boundary between the visible and the invisible faces. The visible
ones must be eliminated and replaced by the faces connecting pi and its
horizon (Fig. 4(b)).
Figure 4: Addition of a point pi to the comprehensive convex hull (CCH)
The CCH is stored in a symmetric modified data structure detailed in the pre-
vious section.
Algorithm Shell
IN: CCHk being
{
k = 0 if the CCH does not exist
k > 0 if CCH is a shell of k points
p being the point to be incorporated to the CCHk
OUT: CCHk′ being


k′ = k if p is interior or belongs to the input shell
k′ = k + n
if p and the n− 1 points that generates p
are incorporated to the CCHk
Generate all the projections of p on each plane x = 0, y = 0 and z = 0, and also
on each axis x, y and z, i.e.
Pr oj ← {px=0, py=0, p z=0, px axis, p y axis, p z axis}
If CCHk is empty
then
Generate CCH with p and all the projections:
Pr oj ← Pr oj ∪ {p}
IncorporatePoints(Pr oj, CCHk)
else
if p is not interior and do not belongs to the CCHk
for each pi ∈ Pr oj
if pi is interior or belongs to the CCHk
then
Pr oj ← Pr oj − {pi}
Pr oj ← Pr oj ∪ {p}
IncorporatePoints(Pr oj, CCHk)
Algorithm IncorporatePoints
IN: CCHk being
{
k = 0 if the CCH do not exist
k > 0 if CCH is a shell of k points
Pr oj being the set of points to be incorporated to the CCHk
OUT: CCHk′ being k
′ = k + n where n is the amount of points stored in Pr oj
for each pi ∈ Pr oj
{insert pi in CCHk+i−1}
VisFaces ← visibles faces from pi
Horizont ← List of edges forming the horizont of VisFaces
Eliminate VisFaces of CCHk+i−1
for each edge ∈ Horizont
Connect edge to pi creating a triangular face
Add the face the CCHk+i−1
5 Conclusions and Future Work
There is very few written in the literature about the three dimensional case. The
visualization we have presented has proved to be very useful for the visualization of
different sets of bargaining problems and their solutions for 3−agents. Before this
tool, it was very difficult to visualize different experimental sets because it is very
tedious to obtain them and its solutions manually.
We hope that this visualization we have developed will also be very useful in
order to gain insight about general properties for the solutions to the bargaining
problems in the three dimensional case, as happened in the 2-dimensional case.
As future work we propose
• From the theoretical point of view, to extend the 2-dimensional solutions to
the 3D case. In this situation, the extension of this visualization envisions to
be of great help.
• From the visualization point of view, to construct a visualization tool for the
cases we have presented here and for the extended cases. This tool will allow
the visualization of different sets and solutions for the n-agents bargaining
problems.
We also plan to use all these visualizations integrated in a visualization tool for
teaching the courses including topics in Bargaining Theory.
6 Bibliography
References
[Cavalie 97] Cavalie´, P., Welch, D., Quintas, L., ”Implementacio´n Computa-
cional a las soluciones cla´sicas del problema del regateo”, Proceed-
ings COMDEX/INFOCOM’97, Bs. As., Argentina, 199-212, 1997.
[de Berg 97] de Berg, M., van Kreveld, M., Overmars, M., Schwarzkopf, O.,
”Computational Geometry ”, Springer Verlag, 1997.
[de Floriani 87] de Floriani, L., ”Surface Representation based on triangular grids
”, The Visual Computer, 3(1):27-50.
[Nash 50] Nash, J. F., ”The Bargaining Problem”, Econometrica, 28:155-162,
1950.
[Kalai 75] Kalai, E. , M. Smorodinsky, ”Others Solutions to Nash’s Bargaining
Problem”, Econometrica, 43:513-518, 1975.
[Thompson 94] Thompson, W., ”Cooperative Models of Bargaining”, Handbook of
Game Theory with economic applications, vol 2, North Holland,
1994.
[Weiler 85] Weiler, K. ”Edge-based data structures for solid modeling in curved-
surface environments ”, IEEE Computer Graphics and Applica-
tions, 5(1):21-40, January 1985.
[Woo 85] Woo, T. ”A Combinatorial Analysis of Boundary Data Structure
Schemata ”, IEEE Computer Graphics and Applications, 5(3):19-
27, May 1985.
